Public reporting burder for this collection of information is estibated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burder to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
REPORT DATE (DD-
MM
COUNTERING TERRORISM IN THE HEARTLAND -CAN WE AFFORD POSSE COMITATUS ANY LONGER?
There are moments in history when events suddenly allow us to see the challenges ahead with a degree of clarity previously unimaginable. . . Now we see clearly the challenges facing usand we are confronting them. . . As we have been for more than 227 years, the Army is dedicated to delivering victory for our nation, today and in the future.
-Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army Twenty years ago, a young infantry lieutenant driving his command vehicle, a 1979 Gran Prix, led his platoon of combat-equipped soldiers loaded on a 2½-ton truck out the back gate of Fort Carson, Colorado. Their mission: to quell a breach of the peace involving other company soldiers at a private residence in nearby Fountain, Colorado. As alleged in the inevitable lawsuit that followed:
the defendants' negligent and wrongful acts were engaged in while the defendants were acting as investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States government as the defendants intended to imprison and arrest all of the plaintiffs . . . and intended to conduct a search of all of the plaintiffs' residences.1
Luckily, save allegations of ridicule, embarrassment, mental anguish, and invasion of privacy, no one was injured. Yet variations on this episode, which served to educate all involved on the coverage of the Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385), The Posse Comitatus Act ("PCA") is not the sacred cow it once may have been. Over time, Congress has gradually carved out exceptions to prohibitions on use of the military for law enforcement. These legislative measures recognize that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with likely access by committed terrorist groups, changes the policy calculus. In a perfect world, under our democratic tradition, local policemen enforce domestic law, while soldiers fight enemies abroad. But the neat dichotomy between law enforcement and national security has blurred. In some cases, using military force in the U.S. to counter a threat by terrorists may indeed constitute the most effective means to preserve national security.
If no longer a sacred cow, posse comitatus remains a significant obstacle to unified action on homeland defense. On several issues over the 15 months since the terrorist strikes of 11 September 2001, elected and appointed officials have re-examined longstanding policies that, like posse comitatus, might hinder an effective approach to homeland security. Caution underlies these efforts, with good reason. No one desires to alter fundamentally the essential fabric of American society. With our system under attack, we must heed more than ever the counsel of Supreme Court Justice Jackson not "to emphasize transient results upon policies and lose sight of enduring consequences upon the balanced structure of our Republic." 3 At the same time, however, all wish to ensure we have the right mix of capabilities in effect to prevent other large-scale acts of terrorism here. Revisions to posse comitatus logically serve that goal.
Moreover, this effort could generate beneficial unintended consequences. As an institution, the U.S. Army enjoys tremendous respect from the citizens of this country. The ability to earn that respect tangibly, through demonstrated action in the homeland, can further cement the rapport we maintain with the public we serve.
THE DEBATE OPENS
With the September, 2002 release of the National Security Strategy of the United States ("NSS"), the Bush Administration has revealed the cornerstone of its national security foundation for the next few years. As expected, task one -"defending our Nation against its enemies" 4 -has assumed greater prominence following the events of 11 September 2001. In his introduction to the NSS, President Bush promises to "defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants," 5 in that order.
Section III of the NSS outlines the U.S. strategy to defeat global terrorism. Conceding this to be unlike any war in our history, we will commit all the elements of our national and international power to identify and destroy terrorist threats before they reach our borders. 6 In addition, the government has embarked upon a significant structural reorganization to prosecute this war. New organizations include the Department of Homeland Security and a unified military command with responsibility for North America. 7 The new unified command, U.S. Northern
Command, recognizes the prominence of posse comitatus, evidenced by its inclusion of a fact sheet on PCA, one of five fact sheets on its recently developed web site. 8 In part, the new organizations stem from 2001's realization that we will not destroy all terrorist threats before they reach our borders. Hence, domestic counterterrorism serves as a critical component of an enhanced homeland security posture.
"Homeland Security" contains its own strategic primer. The National Strategy for Homeland Security ("SHS") is the first of several additional "planks" that, when published, will reinforce the formal NSS structure. 9 One of the additional planks, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, defines our "war plan" against international terrorism. 10 Prominently, the NSS and SHS together take precedence over all other national strategies, programs, and plans.
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The SHS attests that "the U.S. government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks." 12 Accordingly, one of the "critical mission areas" 13 addressed in the SHS is domestic counterterrorism. Within that mission area, the "national vision" highlights our intent to "use all legal means --both traditional and nontraditional --to identify, halt, and where appropriate, prosecute terrorists in the United States."
14
The domestic counterterrorism section of the SHS reflects a "redefined mission" for federal, state and local law enforcement authorities. 15 The SHS is silent, however, on the prospect of a redefined domestic mission for the U.S. military.
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism ("SCT") affirms that combating terrorism and securing the U.S. from future attacks are the two top priorities of the Bush Administration.
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Complementing the SHS, the SCT orients on identifying and defusing threats before they reach U.S. borders. One of the means toward that end is the President's direction to develop an interagency Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to merge and analyze all threat information in one location. This will ensure "that the right people are in the right places to protect the American people."
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In summary, this Administration's domestic counterterrorism policy is as follows:
-protect the homeland by countering terrorism, to defend the peace.
-coordinate all of our elements of power.
-implement structural reforms.
-use all legal means available (even if non-traditional).
-reorient law enforcement authorities to address the emergent threat.
If that policy obtains, as an element of national power the military must carve out its domestic role in the "interagency, integrated" homeland security effort. Recently, SECDEF Donald 
POSSE COMITATUS HISTORY
Posse comitatus reveals a rich historical tradition, but remains broadly misunderstood and misinterpreted. As with much of the American legal tradition, we look to English common law for the background of posse comitatus. Posse comitatus embodies the idea that citizens enforce the law best. At common law, the sheriff could invoke "the power of the county" to summon all men 15 and older to enforce the law. 21 An empowered citizen constabulary argues against the need for a large standing army. That concept resonated with American colonists who experienced the abuses of George III, including the forced quarter of British troops among the civilian population.
22
Later, in Federalist Number 29, Alexander Hamilton skillfully defended the Constitutional framework proposed to govern the militia. Constitutional detractors claimed that execution of federal law would require magistrates to rely solely on the militia, since the Constitution was silent on the ability of the magistrate to invoke assistance from the posse comitatus. Hamilton scoffed at this claim. He chastised those who, in the same breath, claimed the powers of the federal government would be despotic and unlimited even though that same government ostensibly lacked the authority to call out the posse comitatus.
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Hamilton noted the possibility that standing armies might be dangerous to liberty, and placed the militia in counterpoise to that danger. In addition, Hamilton railed against those who viewed the militia as dangerous to American liberty:
Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? With the election of the Republican candidate for President, Rutherford B. Hayes, Reconstruction ended. Southern Democrats perceived that the presence of federal troops at polling places, ensuring the rights of black citizens to vote, enabled Hayes to "steal" a close election from Samuel J. Tilden. 34 Congress also increasingly opposed the practice of local sheriffs and U.S. marshals calling out federal troops on their own authority. 35 The Southerners allied with Northern Democrats who opposed the use of the Army to crush railroad unions in the Pittsburgh railroad riots of 1877. 36 An 1878 amendment to the Army appropriation bill resulted in the Posse Comitatus Act. Yet even with its passage, the President and Congress retained the ability to direct the Army to enforce the law.
37
In large part, the Army welcomed the restrictions placed by the Posse Comitatus Act.
Some officers viewed domestic policing requirements as "corrupting" to the institution. In some instances, soldiers were employed apart from their chain of command, and placed in situations where they took orders from those whose actions had created the unrest at issue.
38
For more than 100 years following the enactment of posse comitatus, restrictions emplaced generated little serious concern. Threats to America's security arose abroad, and stayed largely abroad. The armed forces deployed to meet and defeat distant threats. That model changed dramatically on 11 September 2001. In the wake of that tragedy, and with a mandate to shore up the defense of the homeland, government policies across the board invite renewed scrutiny.
CALLS FOR REVISION
Calls to reexamine Posse Comitatus began almost immediately after the events of 11 General Eberhart, had announced consistently they were not aware of any specific changes required for posse comitatus.
46
Since then, Mr. Fidell's observation --that proposals to repeal posse comitatus unite opposition from both ends of the ideological spectrum --has borne fruit. The conservative Washington Times ran a recent editorial characterizing posse comitatus as "a barrier against the pell-mell deployment of troops by the President against the American people" and "one of the most commonsense-laden pieces of legislation ever to come out of Washington." 47 The New
York Times, not known for sharing the editorial views of the Washington Times, termed PCA "an important bulwark of civilian supremacy and a barrier to the erosion of basic civil liberties." 48 In reality, though, the bulwark has gradually eroded.
THE BULWARK ERODES
Over the years, Congress has carved out several noteworthy exceptions to the prohibitions of Posse Comitatus. Some view this trend with alarm, asserting that the desire of elected officials "to do something" in times of danger erodes fundamental limitations the PCA places on the U.S. armed forces. The existing statutory exceptions to posse comitatus demonstrate the willingness of Congress to specify a domestic military role when circumstances demand the employment of unique military capabilities. Yet this approach, essentially a legislative patchwork, appears haphazard at best. An effective strategy to enhance homeland security requires unity of effort.
Unfortunately, the tendency to frame the issue as "this measure supports law enforcement (crime)" as opposed to "this measure improves national security (war)" hinders pursuit of that unity. After all, national security encompasses far more than law enforcement. Our best efforts to prevent another significant terrorist attack may prove inadequate; focusing narrowly on only one aspect of the issue fails the legitimate expectations of the American people.
AN EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK
Any effort to consider revising or repealing posse comitatus requires first a conceptual framework to outline the problem we now face. From the Administration's perspective, countering terrorism is the fundamental task to preserve America's security. 55 Historically, the U.S. has applied diverse elements of national power --economic, military, diplomatic, and information --in peace and war, responding to a full range of challenges to America's interests abroad. The U.S. has now declared war on terrorism. The threat has effectively penetrated our borders and expressed the intent to do so again wherever and whenever possible. Can we simply swap the traditional elements of peacetime and wartime power for a law enforcementcentered response against common criminals engaged in common-law crimes? Many policymakers express discomfort with that default option.
This tension -between those who see our traditional framework as essentially adequate to meet a transient terrorist threat and those who perceive an immediate need for sweeping structural reforms -underlies a broader debate concerning post-9/11 policies. 56 In a recent thoughtful analysis, Professor Noah Feldman argues that terrorism on the scale of the 11
September attacks "defies easy categorization" under several criteria he advances to distinguish crimes from war. If terrorism is definitively neither crime nor war, but a hybrid, how do we construct the framework that will allow a reasoned analysis of the need to revise posse comitatus? The report of the Hart-Rudman Commission specifies the essential requirement that homeland security measures exist within a legal framework that protects liberty and privacy for U.S.
citizens.
61 Admiral Loy, Commandant of the Coast Guard, agrees that the first guiding principle in a comprehensive approach to homeland security must be adherence to the Constitution and the rule of law. 62 In Professor Feldman's view, the values we seek to protect drive the issue.
The crime/war distinction for terrorism bears no fruit. Rather liberty, privacy, the rule of law and safety are the true values we must safeguard.
63
Those values prove revealing. No serious American can argue that we should ignore either the Constitution or the rule of law that have well-served the republic for more than 225 years. Differences arise, however, when the required task is balancing the other three values.
On the one hand, any reasonable measure to increase safety for Americans from further terrorist attacks warrants consideration. As one commentator observed, the threats themselves consist of "low-probability, high consequence events that are impossible to absolutely prevent and impossible to politically ignore." 64 While conceding that absolute prevention is next to impossible, Frank Gaffney, Jr., of the Center for National Security asserts we must yet make "every effort . . . to defend the American people." 65 On the other hand, the preservation of civil liberties and privacy exist as fundamental core values embodied throughout the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Any attempt to enhance safety while degrading civil liberties or infringing privacy rights brings the issue squarely to the fore. The tension has infected a range of issues in the post-9/11 world: intelligence collection and dissemination, terrorist detentions, and the proposed use of military commissions, among others.
These issues, collectively, illustrate the need for a unified approach to countering terrorism. Essentially, enhancing homeland security against terrorism entails unified action in three phases of effort: prediction, prevention and response. Posse comitatus restrictions proscribe potential military actions most significantly in the response phase of effort. Before demonstrating that revisions to posse comitatus could improve the response to terrorist threats within the homeland, it is worthwhile to discuss ongoing initiatives in the prediction and prevention phases.
In each of these phases, just as with posse comitatus, sacred cows are under attack, or have been defeated recently through legislation or executive action. The effect of these sundry reforms awaits further analysis: at the end of the day, the institutions of government may alter the revised structures to their pre-9/11 state. Nevertheless, the significance of these alterations, for this paper, lies in demonstrating that policymakers have exhibited a newfound willingness to tweak the structures that control a broad range of governmental actions. In a recent address at the Army War College, a senior Administration official candidly observed that even veteran interagency players -in this changed world environment -are thinking through these issues from perspectives never seen before. 66 That same willingness to consider anew the practical limitations of posse comitatus will produce tremendous dividends.
Prediction and prevention both relate to the need for the best intelligence we can obtain about the intentions and plans of those who would carry out terrorist attacks against Americans at home. For that reason, the homeland security community has focused extensively on improving the acquisition and timely dissemination, within the interagency, of relevant If the FBI fails in its redefined focus, the failure will not derive from a lack of effort by the Congress to give the FBI needed powers to prosecute the new "war." Less than 6 weeks after the terrorist strikes of 11 September, Congress passed and the President signed into law the U.S.A. Patriot Act. As designed, the Patriot Act should improve the exchange of information between the FBI and other agencies, to include the CIA, with terrorism responsibilities. 71 The Act has removed some "legal fire walls" 72 that stemmed from FBI abuses in the era of Director J.
Edgar Hoover, when the bureau built extensive files on U.S. citizens. The Patriot Act affords the FBI greater latitude to acquire information concerning potential terrorist attacks and effects changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 73 In a recent challenge before the FISA court of appeals, the appellate court affirmed the legality of the expanded powers to acquire and most importantly, disseminate, information obtained via a FISA warrant.
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A common thread unites the changes discussed above: the need to improve our capabilities to predict the threats we will face. At the same time, however, the new security environment has also affected our prevention strategy. The use of all of these measures requires approaching the problem from other than a law enforcement perspective. As much as anything, we have learned to eliminate some of the traditional "roles and missions" stovepipes post-9/11, and are exploiting synergies through sharing of relevant foreign and domestic intelligence, an interagency approach to threat analysis, and a renewed commitment to domestic security. Further tweaking may prove useful, from the perspective of "how can we best achieve mission success?" Incremental changes to improve the cumulative time required to respond to a terrorist incident warrant consideration.
Speed drives the need to revise posse comitatus. Several other factors also favor broadening the military's authority to assume an enhanced role in homeland defense within U.S.
borders. First, such a move would provide unity of effort. Northern Command's assumption of the homeland defense mission enables it to defend the homeland not just from airborne threats within U.S. airspace, but also from ground-based threats just as lethal. Working with the Department of Homeland Security in a framework to be developed over time, NORTHCOM should receive delegated authority for a rapid commitment of appropriate military assets.
Already, NORTHCOM has the authority and rules of engagement in place to engage specified airborne threats. 85 Why, logically, should we restrict the authority to commit ground elements against identified terrorist threats of similar magnitude? In addition, under the Unified Command Plan, NORTHCOM now has command over Joint Task Force -Civil Support and Joint Task
Force Six, which exercise consequence management and counterdrug missions, respectively. The challenge exists now, in an era of relatively generous funding, and will only grow over the next 10-20 years. In that time, defense faces an ever-increasing competition for the discretionary dollars available in the budget. 95 An aging baby boomer population will stress both social security and health care funding. 96 The Administration plans further tax cuts, too, that will only exacerbate the budget fight. A recent Economist magazine supplement argues that even at $379 billion, America's defense share of the probable gross domestic product remains below 4%, substantially less than historical levels of wartime (to include Cold War) spending. 97 It remains to be seen, though, whether an Administration gearing for reelection in 2004, poised for a war with Iraq, and facing an environment of economic uncertainty, can push through another real increase in the defense budget. In that sense, DoD can bolster its claim to a fair share of future discretionary dollars by demonstrating greater relevance in the homeland security fight.
FUNCTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS -THIS IS WAR
In 1861, as President Abraham Lincoln prepared the country for the monumental struggle to follow, he determined it necessary to authorize suspension of the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety. That action brought him into direct conflict with the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Roger Taney. In a message to a special session of Congress, on July 4, 1861, Lincoln asked, eloquently: "[a]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be violated?" 98 Lincoln's simple question allowed only one answer. He recognized that war requires some measures inconceivable in peacetime.
The question Lincoln framed resonates again today. Jeffrey Norwitz cites findings by the National Commission on Terrorism that the Pentagon has unrecognized "organizational and resource strengths as they relate to terrorism." 99 Norwitz argues that when strictly construed, upon Presidential order, the PCA presents no obstacle to a partnership of the armed forces and civil authority in domestic security. Taking a longer view, he advocates a broadened role for the armed forces in traditional law enforcement roles.
100
All concede the military possesses unique ability to handle divergent threats.
Particularly in mission areas including terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and cyberattacks, the military can apply significant resources to monitor, track, locate and preempt attacks. 101 Unclassified sources reflect the existence of a counterterrorist organization within DoD, organized to perform such operations when required. 102 With an asymmetric threat, we need greater ability to counter it across the spectrum. In many cases, military intervention may most effectively address threats such as those posed by heavily armed terrorists. 
OPPOSITION TO REFORM
Admittedly, many view any attempt to ease PCA restrictions as the wrong tack entirely.
Congressman Ron Paul believes that with the imminent repeal of PCA, "liberty, the Constitution, and the republic will suffer another major setback." 107 Mackubin Owens, a professor at the Naval War College, adds: "weakening the PCA in response to terrorism makes for terrible national security policy, poor politics, and guaranteed failure in the terror war." 108 Opponents usually raise 4 primary objections: it would blur the line between essentially military and essentially civilian roles; it would adversely affect military readiness; the military possesses the wrong skill-set for this effort; and most fundamentally, it would undermine federalism and civilian control of the military.
109
As discussed above, concern about blurred lines ignores the nature of the new threat, one unlike any traditional criminal threat, and one that poses the greatest threat to domestic security. Most Americans, however, remain unconvinced. Eugene Fidell, president of the The effect on readiness and the claim of an inapposite skill set are arguments that resound both outside and within the military. Military personnel view as their fundamental task to fight and win the nation's wars. Over-committed and under-resourced units look for a break in the storm, and seek to avert resource expenditures for perceived "non-core" tasks. Without fail, we must prepare for major combat operations abroad. Having said that, when the threat has invaded the homeland, protecting the homeland becomes our primary responsibility. The
American people expect its armed forces to conduct a range of missions across the spectrum of conflict. Forward presence and power projection capabilities, by necessity, lag in priority behind a secure domestic environment. As to the necessary skills, many of the tasks that promote homeland security are those the military has performed with increasing frequency and aptitude in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and now Afghanistan. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the military alone possesses required capabilities to respond to certain terrorist threats, such as those involving sophisticated WMD. One proposal leaves PCA intact, calling for a para-military civil defense force as potentially a "better long-term solution" to defend the homeland. 114 It is not at all clear, though, that a solution entailing more people, money, and levels of coordination, staffing, and liaison best serves the national interest.
The final argument, one that cannot be dismissed casually, concerns the effect revisions to posse comitatus would have on our structure of governance and on civil-military relations inherent in that structure. The U.S. Constitution embodies its framers' concerns, derived from personal experience, with a large standing army and preference for a militia to meet most security requirements. In a constitutional democracy, "government is particularly complex."
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Post 9/11, our domestic security policies must retain the overarching structure that divides power among coordinate and subordinate branches of federal, state and local government.
The strategic context of the twentieth century demonstrated the need to overcome the founders' distaste for a large standing army. Yet a large standing army argues compellingly for significant restrictions on its domestic employment --to curb the potential for misusing the Army to further a partisan political agenda. Jeffrey Norwitz claims that today's "citizen-soldiers, exemplifying the truest sense of volunteerism as envisioned by George Washington" and "attuned to permissible conduct" should be trusted with domestic security. 116 Tom Lujan echoes that the experience and training of today's soldiers enable them to make "the right decisions" in difficult situations.
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Others exhibit far less enthusiasm. Some cite "the abuses and serial military dictatorships" the U.S. has avoided to date but has also seen frequently in our hemisphere.
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Some warn that civil-military relations over the last several years have declined; logically, they worry about an expanded influence in American society by a contemptuous military unresponsive to civilian authorities. 119 America's civil-military relations history reveals that:
Acceptance of civilian supremacy and control by an obedient military has been the core principle of the American tradition of civil-military relations. U.S. military officers take an oath to uphold the democratic institutions that form the very fabric of the American way of life. Their client is American society, which has entrusted the officer corps with the mission of preserving the nation's values and national purpose. Ultimately, every act of the American military professional is connected to these realities -he or she is in service to the citizens of a democratic state who bestow their trust and treasure with the primary expectation that their state and its democratic nature will be preserved. repealed an extraordinary number of measures thought to constitute essential parts of the fabric of American government, in a focused campaign to improve our response to terrorist threats.
Apply that same effort to posse comitatus. We can preserve both our national values and our national purpose.
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